NIST IR 8547 Quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated from 2030 and disallowed by 2035. Assess your exposure

Firmware, Boot & Kernel Layer

Elvas QBoot
Quantum Secure Boot

Stops bootkits, firmware implants and rootkits before the operating system starts. QBoot verifies every boot stage with post-quantum signatures and measures it into the TPM, so a remote verifier can prove device integrity.

Request a DemoView Architecture
qboot — signing & verification
$ qboot keygen --alg ml-dsa-87 --store hsm://slot/0
$ qboot sign --alg ml-dsa-87 --key hsm://slot/0 \
      --rollback-index 42 vmlinuz-6.8.0
  ✔ signed  vmlinuz-6.8.0.sig  (4627 B · ML-DSA-87)
$ qboot verify --chain /boot --tpm
  ✔ rot → stage1 → uefi → kernel → modules
  ✔ PCRs extended · attestation quote ready

Overview

The problem QBOOT solves

Secure boot is only as strong as the signatures it checks. Today those signatures are RSA or ECDSA. Once they can be forged, an attacker can produce firmware, bootloaders and kernels that every device accepts as genuine. Because embedded and industrial devices stay in service for 10 to 20 years, devices shipping now will still be running when that happens.

Threats mitigated · MITRE ATT&CK

  • T1542.001 System firmware
  • T1542.003 Bootkit
  • T1014 Rootkit
  • T1553.002 Code signing

Technical specifications

Signatures
ML-DSA-87, SLH-DSA, LMS / XMSS
Measurement
TPM 2.0 PCR extension, SHA-384
Key protection
HSM-backed signing, OTP / TPM-anchored key hashes
Boot targets
UEFI and U-Boot
Architectures
x86-64 and ARM64
Update security
PQ-signed packages, anti-rollback index

Architecture

Verified & measured boot chain

Verified & measured boot chainQBOOT
Chain of trust TPM 2.0 Hardware Root of Trust PQ public-key hash · OTP fuses / TPM Stage-1 Bootloader LMS / XMSS signed · SP 800-208 UEFI / U-Boot ML-DSA-87 signature verification Kernel + initramfs ML-DSA-87 · anti-rollback index Kernel modules & services PQ-signed modules · IMA policy verify ✓ verify ✓ verify ✓ verify ✓ PCR 0 PCR 4 PCR 8 PCR 9 PCR 10 → remote attestation measure

Capabilities

Built for security teams, engineered for scale

01

Unbroken PQ chain of trust

Each boot stage verifies the next with ML-DSA or hash-based signatures before handing over execution.

02

Hash-based firmware signing

LMS / XMSS (NIST SP 800-208) for early-stage firmware, as recommended by CNSA 2.0.

03

Measured boot & attestation

Stage digests are extended into TPM 2.0 PCRs so a remote verifier can check device integrity.

04

Rollback & revocation

Monotonic anti-rollback counters and key revocation stop downgrade attacks.

05

HSM-backed signing

Signing keys stay in hardware security modules, and release pipelines sign without exposing key material.

06

Attestation alerts

Integrity failures raise security events so compromised devices can be isolated automatically.

Use cases

Where QBOOT protects you

Servers & data centres

Attest the integrity of every node before it joins a cluster or receives secrets.

Embedded & OT devices

Protect long-lifecycle controllers and gateways that will outlive classical cryptography.

Defence platforms

Meet CNSA 2.0 software and firmware signing requirements on mission systems.

See Elvas QBoot in action

Book a technical demonstration with our engineers and discuss your deployment.

Request a Demo Explore the Platform